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Priming Bush (vs. Obama) increases liking of
American brands: The role of intersubjectively
important values
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1Institute on Asian Consumer Insight, Nanyang Business School,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
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Past research has shown that exposure to cultural symbols can influence personal
preferences. The present research extends this finding by showing that cultural
symbols acquire their cultural significance in part through their associations with
intersubjectively important values—values that are perceived to be prevalent in the
culture. In addition, cultural symbols can influence personal preferences through the
activation of perceived normative preferences. In Study 1, perceived liking of Bush
among Americans was linked to the perceived popularity of intersubjectively
important values in the USA. In Study 2, both priming Bush and personal
endorsement of intersubjectively important values increased Americans’ liking of
iconic brands (brands that symbolize American culture). Furthermore, perceived
normative preferences for iconic brands fully mediated this effect.
Keywords: Cultural influence; American presidents; Intersubjective culture; Brand evaluation;
Cultural fit.
“Miss me yet?” A roadside billboard featuring this caption and a cheery image of
George W. Bush hovered over Interstate 35 in February 2010. Soon, similar
billboards appeared around the country, and there was a spike in consumer
demand for miss-me-yet themed Bush merchandise such as T-shirts and bumper
stickers. Despite Bush’s waning political popularity, for some Americans, Bush
still has a strong marketing appeal. What could be the source of the Bush appeal?
In this article, we propose that a public figure could through its cultural
associations influence consumer preferences. To elaborate, some values,
hereafter referred to as intersubjectively important values, are consensually
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perceived by Americans to be strongly endorsed by other Americans. When a
public Figure (e.g., Bush) is associated with these values, it can prime liking of
other attitude objects that are symbols of American culture (e.g., Apple
Computers, Coca-Cola). The processes described above are captured in the
following quote from David Boaz (2001), vice president of the Cato Institute. In
this quote, Boaz emphasized the cultural significance of Bush, arguing that
people who attack these values also hate other symbols of America:
They hate the culture of markets and liberalism. They hate the Enlightenment and
modernity. They hate reason, science, technology, individualism, pluralism, tolerance,
progress and freedom. And to be more specific, they hate Wall Street, Hollywood,
McDonald’s, Starbucks, Microsoft, Ralph Lauren ads, and the casual joy of American
freedom.
INTERSUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVE TO CULTURAL INFLUENCE
Past studies have found consistent evidence for the effect of culture priming on
personal preferences (Chen, Ng, & Rao, 2005; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-
Martı´nez, 2000; Monga & John, 2007). In these studies, exposing individuals to
symbols of their culture increases the strength of personal preferences for other
cultural symbols. Indeed, culture priming has been shown to be a prevalent and
potent form of cultural influence (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Although the effects
of culture priming are well documented (see Chiu & Hong, 2007), an unanswered
question is how they occur.
In the present article, we tested an intersubjective account of cultural influence
(Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, &Wan, 2010; Chiu, Ng, & Au, in press)
in the context of brand evaluations. Brand evaluation is the appropriate context
for the present investigation because some brands are widely recognized as iconic
national brands because of their strong associations with the culture of their
country of origin (Torelli & Alhuwalia, 2012; Torelli, Keh, & Chiu, 2010;
Torelli, O¨zsomer, Carvalho, Keh, & Maehle, 2012; Zhang & Gelb, 1996).
According to this account, a cultural symbol (Bush) derives its cultural
significance from its associations with intersubjectively important values.
Although an iconic American brand (e.g., Nike) has other rich associations, after
having been primed with a cultural symbol (e.g., Bush), because of the prime’s
cultural significance, the perceiver would attend to the cultural meanings of the
brand and view it as a brand that Americans prefer. Such perceptions, hereafter
referred to as perceived normative preferences, would in turn elevate the
perceiver’s personal liking for the brand.
According to the intersubjective account, cultural symbols derive their cultural
significance from its associations with intersubjectively important values.
Intersubjectively important values are conceptually different from objectively
important ones, which refer to the values with the strongest endorsement from
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members of the culture. Intersubjectively important values are identified by
asking cultural informants to rate the importance of various values to other
members of the culture (Wan & Chiu, 2009). In contrast, objectively important
values are identified by asking members of the culture to rate the importance of a
representative collection of values to the self (Wan & Chiu, 2009; Wan, Chiu,
Peng, & Tam, 2007a; Wan et al., 2007b). Although some intersubjectively
important values are also objectively important, and vice versa, for several
reasons, the overlap is not perfect (Wan et al., 2007b). First, because people do
not have perfect knowledge of the social distribution of values in their society,
they may not know which values are objectively important. This is particularly
the case in a pluralistic society like the USA. Imperfect knowledge about the
social distribution of values also renders objectively important values less
predictive of personal preferences. Second, although people may not know the
social distribution of values well, because intersubjectively important values are
embodied in many external carriers of cultures (e.g., social conventions, cultural
artifacts; see Chiu et al., 2010), perceivers can infer what the intersubjectively
important values are from the values embodied in the external carriers, instead of
anchoring their inferences on their personal values. Finally, past research has
shown that most people believe that their values are less culturally typical than
those of other cultural members (Wan et al., 2007a). This uniqueness bias also
attenuates the correspondence between objectively and intersubjectively
important values.
There is some evidence that public figures would become culturally significant
symbols when they are perceived to embody intersubjectively important values.
For example, American college students perceive Tom Hanks to be an American
icon and rate him favorably after learning that he has publicly exhibited behaviors
that are congruent with the intersubjectively important value of “choosing one’s
own goal” (Wan, Torelli, & Chiu, 2010; see also Jiang et al., 2011). If cultural
symbols derive their cultural significance from their associations with
intersubjectively important values, there should be positive associations between
the perceived likability of the cultural symbol (perceived normative preferences
for Bush) and the perceived popularity of the intersubjectively important values
in the culture.
We also assume that the perceived normative preferences activated by culture
priming can affect personal preferences of culturally iconic brands such as Apple
and Nike. According to the shared reality theory (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll,
2005; Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009), once people have established a
shared reality with others, they can trust others’ views of things and use them to
guide judgments and actions. Accordingly, people may base their personal
preferences on perceived normative preferences. Consistent with this idea, there
is a sizable body of evidence that cultural differences in personal preferences are
in part mediated by cultural differences in perceived normative preferences (e.g.,
Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 2009; Zou et al., 2009). Recent neuroscience
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evidence also shows that people often integrate normative opinions
spontaneously into their personal opinions (Zaki, Schirmer, & Mitchell, 2011).
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
The present research seeks to make three contributions. First, we seek to provide
evidence that cultural symbols derive their cultural significance from their
associations with intersubjectively important values. To achieve this goal, in
Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that Americans who perceived intersubjectively
important values to be more popular in the USA would expect Bush to be more
likable among Americans.
Second, we attempt to show that culture priming can influence personal
preferences through the activation of perceived normative preferences. To
achieve this objective, in Study 2, we tested the hypothesis that priming Bush and
its cultural associations would activate the perceived normative preferences for
iconic brands among Americans, which, in turn, would enhance personal liking of
iconic American brands.
Finally, the social cognitive effect of culture priming is short-lived;
sustainability of cultural influence requires internalization of the intersubjectively
important values. Some members of a culture internalize the intersubjectively
important values; these individuals regard intersubjectively important values as
personally important. Past research has shown that these individuals tend to
identify strongly with their culture and like attitude objects that symbolize their
culture (Wan et al., 2007a, 2007b; Wan, Tam, & Chiu, 2010; Zhang & Chiu,
2012). We refer to this effect as the cultural fit effect. However, past research has
not examined the effects of cultural fit (chronic cultural influence) and culture
priming (momentary influence of culture) in the same study. We addressed this
research gap in Study 2.As illustrated in Figure 1, we hypothesize that in the
Figure 1. Hypothesized effect of Bush priming and personal endorsement of intersubjectively
important values on perceived normative preferences and personal liking of iconic brands.
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absence of Bush priming, individuals who have internalized intersubjectively
important values are more likely than those who have not to focus on the cultural
significance of iconic American brands, view them as brands that Americans
prefer, and like these brands more.
STUDY 1
Study 1 has three objectives. First, we sought to demonstrate that
intersubjectively important values are different from objectively important
ones. Second, we sought to provide a preliminary test of the effect of cultural fit
on personal liking for Bush. The studies were conducted between October 2009
and June 2010.Based on our selected review of the popular discourse at the time
of data collection, it seems that many Americans associated Bush with the
conventional values in the USA. If Bush was associated with intersubjectively
important values in the USA, Americans who endorsed these values more
strongly would like him more. In contrast, at the time of data collection, Obama
was often portrayed as a change agent and hence might not be associated with
intersubjectively important American values. We included measures of liking for
Obama to explore this possibility. Finally, we included a pilot study for Study 2,
which was designed to test the joint effects of Bush priming and personal
endorsement of intersubjectively important values on personal liking of iconic
American brands.
Method
To identify intersubjectively important values, we had Caucasian American
undergraduates (N ¼ 89, 34.8% male; Mage ¼ 18.79 years, SD ¼ 1.10) from a
public university in the USA respond to the 56-item Schwartz Value Survey
(SVS; Schwartz, 1992)—a survey of seven major clusters of cultural values
(embeddedness, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, hierarchy, egalitar-
ianism, mastery, and harmony). They estimated how important each SVS value
was to most Americans on an eight-point scale, ranging from “not important” to
“extremely important.” In addition, to identify objectively important values, we
also had the participants rate the importance of each value to the self, using the
same scale.
Before completing the SVS, participants rated their personal liking of Bush and
Obama on five evaluation items (unpleasant–pleasant, foolish–wise, awful–
nice, unintelligent–intelligent, and dislike–like; aBush ¼ .92; aObama ¼ .94),
each on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). They also used the same scale
to rate how much they thought Americans liked Bush and Obama on the same set
of items (aBush ¼ .87; aObama¼.91).
Finally, as a pretest for Study 2, participants were asked to rate the extent to
which 14 brands were symbols of American culture on a seven-point scale that
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ranged from “definitely not an American brand” to “definitely an American
brand” at the end of the study. In past research (Torelli et al., 2010), 7 of these 14
brands received high iconicity ratings (American Express, Ford, Apple
Computer, Walmart, Starbucks, Coke, and Nike) and 7 (Coffeemate, Heinz
Ketchup, New Balance, Gateway Computer, BIC pen, Caribou Coffee, and
Chrysler) received relatively low iconicity ratings. The iconic and non-iconic
brands were matched on product categories. Participants were debriefed and
awarded course requirement credits at the conclusion of the study.
Results
Intersubjectively and objectively important values
Table 1 summarizes the variables measured in the current study. We followed the
standard scoring procedures (Schwartz, 1992) to construct measures of the
importance of each of the seven value clusters (e.g., embeddedness, intellectual
autonomy) to self and to most Americans. Next, for each participant, to measure
the degree of correspondence between values that were important to the self and
those that were perceived to be important to Americans, we correlated the relative
importance of the value clusters to the self with the relative importance of the value
clusters to Americans. The mean of the intraindividual correlations was small
(mean r ¼ .16, SD ¼ .46), although it was significantly above 0, t(87) ¼ 3.41,
TABLE 1
Summary of key variables and hypotheses
Intersubjectively important values Objectively important values
Definition Values consensually perceived by
cultural informants to be strongly
endorsed by cultural members
Values that receive the strongest
endorsement from members of
the culture
Perceived popularity of Individual differences in the extent
to which the intersubjectively
important values are perceived
to be popular among other cultural
members
Individual differences in the
extent to which the objectively
important values are perceived
to be popular among other
cultural members
Hypothesize to predict perceived
normative preferences of cultural
icons, which may indirectly influence
personal liking of the icons
Personal importance of Individual differences in the strength
of personal endorsement of
intersubjectively important values
Individual differences in the
strength of personal endorsement
of objectively important values
Hypothesize to predict personal
liking of cultural icons
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p ¼ .0005.This result supported our assumption that intersubjectively and
objectively important values are partially dissociated at the individual level.
Table 2 shows the means (across participants) of the two types of importance
ratings for the seven value clusters. The two most intersubjectively important
values were hierarchy and affective autonomy. Americans were perceived to
value hierarchy more than the remaining categories of values (ts . 3.22, ps ,
.002). With the exception of hierarchy, Americans were also perceived to value
affective autonomy more than other categories of values (ts . 1.99, ps , .05).
These two intersubjectively important values did not receive the strongest
personal endorsement from the participants. The most objectively important
values were egalitarianism and mastery. Participants endorsed egalitarianism
more strongly than they did other categories of values (ts. 2.33, ps, .05). With
the exception of egalitarianism, participants also endorsed mastery more than
they did other categories of values (ts . 4.46, ps , .001). Taken together,
consistent with past findings (Wan et al., 2007a, 2007b), intersubjectively and
objectively important values do not have much overlap.
Value associations of Bush
Next, we tested the hypothesized relationship between the perceived normative
preferences for Bush and the perceived popularity of the intersubjectively
important values. We hypothesize that participants who perceived the
intersubjectively important values to be more popular among Americans would
estimate Bush to be more likable among Americans. To test this hypothesis, we
constructed a measure of perceived popularity of intersubjectively important
values using the weighted mean of the perceived popularity of the seven value
clusters. Specifically, we ranked the value clusters according to their mean
perceived importance to Americans (Intersubjective Rank). For each participant,
we created a measure of perceived popularity of intersubjectively important
TABLE 2
Mean levels of importance of the seven categories of cultural values to Americans and
the self
Importance to Americans Importance to the self
Hierarchy 6.85 (1.07) 5.33 (1.20)
Affective autonomy 6.44 (1.00) 6.82 (0.79)
Mastery 6.21 (1.07) 6.89 (0.66)
Egalitarianism 6.20 (0.93) 7.09 (0.80)
Embeddedness 6.13 (0.93) 6.77 (0.75)
Intellectual autonomy 5.54 (1.21) 6.73 (0.90)
Harmony 4.89 (1.26) 6.04 (1.25)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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values [P(Int.Val)] using the following formula:1
PðInt:ValÞ ¼
X
ð82 Intersubjective RankiÞ £ Popularity Rating ðValueiÞ:
Participants with higher scores on this measure perceived intersubjectively
important values to be more popular among Americans.2
As shown in Table 3, participants who rated intersubjectively important values
to be more popular among Americans also expected Americans to like Bush more
(r ¼ .23, p ¼ .03). Perceived popularity of intersubjectively important values did
not predict perceived normative preferences for Obama (r ¼ .07, p ¼ .53) or
personal liking of Bush (r ¼ .12, p ¼ .26) and Obama (r ¼ .08, p ¼ .48). This
result suggests that despite Bush’s waning political popularity, Americans still
associated him with intersubjectively important American values. When Bush
left the Oval Office, as some commentators noted, Bush retained his American
TABLE 3
Correlation of perceived normative preferences and personal liking for Bush and
Obama with perceived popularity of intersubjectively and objectively important values
Perceived
normative
preferences
for Bush
Personal
liking for
Bush
Perceived
normative
preferences
for Obama
Personal
liking for
Obama
Perceived popularity of intersubjectively important
values 1 P(Int.Val)a
.23* .12 .07 .08
Perceived popularity of intersubjectively important
values 2 P(Int.Val0)b
.23* .13 .04 .05
Perceived popularity of objectively important
values 1 P(Obj.Val)c
.10 .15 .14 .11
Perceived popularity of objectively important
values 2 P(Obj.Val0)d
.12 .07 .07 .12
*p , .05.
aP(Int.Val) ¼ S(8-Intersubjective Ranki) £ Popularity Rating(Valuei).
bP(Int.Val0) ¼ Popularity Rating (Hierarchy) þ Popularity Rating (Affective Autonomy).
cP(Obj.Val) ¼ S(8-Objective Ranki) £ Popularity Rating (Valuei).
d P(Obj.Val0) ¼ Popularity Rating (Egalitarianism) þ Popularity Rating (Mastery).
1P(Int.Val) ¼ 7 £ Popularity Rating (Hierarchy)þ6 £ Popularity Rating (Affective Autonomy)
þ5 £ Popularity Rating (Mastery) þ4 £ Popularity Rating(Egalitarianism) þ3 £ Popularity
Rating (Embeddedness) þ2 £ Popularity Rating (Intellectual Autonomy) þ1 £ Popularity Rating
(Harmony).
2We created an alternative measure of perceived popularity of intersubjectively important values P
(Int.Val0) using the mean of the perceived popularity of hierarchy and affective autonomy, the two
values with significantly higher mean importance to Americans than did the remaining five values. As
shown in Table 3, the results were consistent across measures. Normative preferences for Bush among
Americans was positively correlated with P(Int.Val0) (r ¼ .23, p ¼ .03). In contrast, perceived liking
for Obama among Americans was not correlated with P(Int.Val0) (r ¼ .05, p ¼ .65).
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cowboy image through his accent and strong anchorage to his Texas roots. For
example, Piers Morgan, Editor of the British Daily Mirror, wrote, “I think people
look at him [Bush] and think John Wayne” (Rodgers, 2003).
Unlike perceived popularity of intersubjectively values, perceived popularity
of objectively important values did not predict perceived normative preferences
or personal liking for Bush or Obama. We created a measure of perceived
popularity of objectively important values by first ranking the seven value
clusters according to their mean importance to the self (Objective Rank). Next,
for each participant, we created a measure of perceived popularity of objectively
important values [P(Obj.Val)] using the following formula:
PðObj:ValÞ ¼
X
ð82 Objective RankiÞ £ Popularity RatingðValueiÞ:
Participants with higher scores on this measure perceived objectively
important values to be more popular among Americans.3
As shown in Table 3, perceived popularity of objectively important values did
not correlate with perceived normative preferences for Bush (r ¼ .10, p ¼ .38) or
Obama (r ¼ .14, p ¼ .21). It also did not predict personal liking of Bush (r ¼ .15,
p ¼ .15) or Obama (r ¼ .11, p ¼ .33).
Effects of cultural fit
Next, we examined the effect of personal endorsement of intersubjectively
important values on personal liking of Bush and Obama. We constructed a
measure of personal endorsement of intersubjectively important values [E(Int.
Val)] using following formula:
EðInt:ValÞ ¼
X
ð82 Intersubjective RankiÞ £ Personal EndorsementðValueiÞ:
Higher scores on this measure indicated stronger personal endorsement of
intersubjectively important values. For comparison purpose, we also constructed
a measure of personal endorsement of objectively important values [P(Obj.Val)]
using the following formula:
PðObj:ValÞ ¼
X
ð82 Objective RankiÞ £ Personal EndorsementðValueiÞ:
As shown in Table 4, personal endorsement of intersubjectively important
values was associated with greater liking for Bush (r ¼ .23, p ¼ .04), but not with
liking for Obama (r ¼ 2 .11, p ¼ .30). Personal endorsement of objectively
3We created an alternative measure (P(Obj.Val00) using the mean of the personal endorsement of
egalitarianism and mastery, the two values with higher mean importance to the self than did the
remaining values. The results were consistent across measures. As shown in Table 3, perceived
normative preferences and personal liking for Bush and Obama were not correlated with this
alternative measure.
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important values was not associated with personal liking for Bush (r ¼ .09,
p ¼ .39) or Obama (r ¼ 2 .07, p ¼ .52).4
Perceived Americanness of brands
As a pretest for Study 2, participants rated the extent to which they regarded the
14 brands as American brands. Seven of these brands had previously been shown
to be iconic American brands (Torelli et al., 2009). For each participant, we
performed a within-subjects regression across the 14 brands, with the brands’
rated Americanness as the dependent variable and the iconicity of the brands
based on past studies (0 ¼ non-iconic brand; 1 ¼ iconic brand; Torelli et al.,
2009) as the predictor. The mean of the regression coefficients obtained from the
89 participants was 0.94 (SD ¼ 0.72), which was significantly greater than 0,
t(88) ¼ 12.37, p , .001. This result showed that the participants rated the iconic
brands as more American than they did the non-iconic ones.
Discussion
Our results show that (a) intersubjectively and objectively important values do
not fully overlap, (b) perceived popularity of intersubjectively important values
TABLE 4
Correlation of perceived normative preferences and personal liking for Bush and
Obama with personal endorsement of intersubjectively and objectively important
values
Perceived
normative
preferences
for Bush
Personal
liking
for Bush
Perceived
normative
preferences
for Obama
Personal
liking for
Obama
Personal endorsement of intersubjectively
important values 1 P(Int.Val)a
.05 .23* .09 2 .11
Personal endorsement of intersubjectively
important values 2 P(Int.Val0)b
.02 .35** .09 2 .13
Personal endorsement of objectively important
values 1 P(Obj.Val)c
.06 .09 .06 2 .07
Personal endorsement of objectively important
values 2 P(Obj.Val0)d
.04 .05 .07 2 .02
*p , .05, ** p , .001.
aP(Int.Val) ¼ S(8-Intersubjective Ranki) £ Personal Endorsement (Valuei).
bP(Int.Val0) ¼ Personal Endorsement (Hierarchy) þ Personal Endorsement (Affective Autonomy).
cP(Obj.Val) ¼ S(8-Objective Ranki) £ Personal Endorsement (Valuei).
dP(Obj.Val0) ¼ Personal Endorsement (Egalitarianism) þ Personal Endorsement (Mastery).
4 As shown in Table 4, we obtained identical results when we used alternative measures of personal
endorsement of intersubjectively or objectively important values.
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predicts perceived normative preferences for Bush, and (c) personal endorsement of
intersubjectively important values predicts personal liking for Bush. These results
support the predictions from the intersubjective account of cultural influence.
Objectively important values are values that are statistically more popular in
the USA. Due to imperfect knowledge of the social distribution of values in the
USA, Americans may not know which values are objectively important in their
country. Imperfect knowledge about the social distribution of values also renders
objectively important values less predictive of personal preferences. It is possible
that the association between intersubjectively and objectively important values
may be stronger in more culturally homogeneous or less pluralistic societies, and
the relationship between personal endorsement of objectively important values
and personal preferences may also be stronger in such societies. This possibility
merits future investigation.
Our results do not imply that liking for Bush or Obama is unrelated to
personally important values. Some people endorse the intersubjectively
important values, and some do not. Because of the association of Bush with
intersubjectively important values, people who endorse these values would like
him better. By the same argument, although Americans do not associate Obama
with intersubjectively important values, they may associate him with other
values. People who personally endorse the values that are perceived to be
associated with Obama should like him more.
STUDY 2
The current study was designed to test the hypothesis that priming Bush would
increase liking for iconic versus non-iconic American brands. Specifically, we
predicted that priming Bush would increase the proneness to perceive iconic (vs.
non-iconic) brands as brands Americans prefer and hence the tendency to like
them more. In addition, consistent with the results of Study 1, in the Control
Condition, without Bush priming, personal endorsement of intersubjectively
important values should also enhance the perceptions of iconic brands as brands
Americans prefer and increase personal liking for these brands.
Method
Caucasian undergraduates (N ¼ 103, Mage ¼ 19.24, SD ¼ 1.16) from a public
university in the USA participated in this study in exchange for course requirement
credits. We used a Priming (3 levels: Bush vs. Obama vs. Control; between-
subjects) £ Brand Iconicity (iconic vs. non-iconic; within-subjects) £
Endorsement of Intersubjectively Important Values (continuous individual
difference) design. Given that many Americans viewed Obama as a change agent
at the time of data collection, we included an Obama Priming Condition to explore
whether priming Obama would reduce personal liking for iconic American brands.
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We primed Bush or Obama by having participants perform a computer-
administered categorization task individually in separate cubicles. On each of the
36 trials in the task, participants saw the name of a famous person on the
computer display and identified the gender of the person by pressing a designated
key on the keyboard as fast as they could. There were three male and three female
target persons, and each person was presented six times in a random order. In all
three conditions, the filler names were Michael Phelps, Leonardo Dicaprio, Demi
Moore, Kate Winslet, and Lindsay Davenport. Bush (Obama) was the third male
target person in the Bush (Obama) Condition. In the Control Condition, we
replaced Bush or Obama with Steven Spielberg. After the priming task,
participants were presented with the seven iconic American brands and the seven
non-iconic ones used in Study 1 in a random order. They rated on a five-point
scale how much they liked each brand (1 ¼ “dislike a lot” to 5 ¼ “like a lot”).
To test whether perceived normative preferences mediated participants’ personal
liking of the brands, we had the participants use the same scale to rate how much
they thought American consumers liked each brand.
Finally, participants indicated their personal endorsement of the values in the
SVS (Schwartz, 1992). We applied the same formula in Study 1 to construct the
measure of personal endorsement of intersubjectively important values.
Results and discussion
Effect of brand iconicity on brand liking
We adopted a multilevel approach to analyze the data. First, we classified the 14
brands into iconic brands and non-iconic ones. Next, for each participant (i),
we regressed liking of the brands on their iconicity (0 ¼ non-iconic brands; 1 ¼
iconic brands). That is, we estimated the predicted liking of participanti for brandj
(Likingij) with the following regression equation:
Likingij ¼ aþ b1i £ Iconicityj: ð1Þ
The sign and size of b1i in Equation 1 indicated the direction and the magnitude
of the effect of cultural iconicity of the brands on the liking of the brands,
respectively.
Across the 103 participants, the mean of b1i was 0.26 (SD ¼ 0.54), which was
significantly greater than 0, t(102) ¼ 4.85, p , .0001. This result indicated that
the participants liked the iconic brands more than they did the non-iconic ones.
Perceived normative preferences mediated the iconicity effect
Next, we tested whether perceived normative preferences mediated the greater
liking for the iconic brands by performing the following within-subjects
regression:
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PerceivedNormative Preferenceij ¼ aþ b2i £ Iconicityj; ð2Þ
Likingij ¼ aþ b1i £ Iconicityj þ b3i £ PerceivedNormative Preferenceij: ð3Þ
In Equation 2, b2i was significant (M ¼ 0.47, SD ¼ 0.42; t(102) ¼ 11.46, p,
.0001), indicating that the participants expected Americans to like the iconic
brands more than the non-iconic ones. In Equation 3, b3i was significant
(M ¼ 0.31, SD ¼ 0.47; t(102) ¼ 6.69, p , .0001), but the effect of iconicity
(b1i) was not (M ¼ 0.10, SD ¼ 0.56, t(102) ¼ 1.88, p ¼ .06). This result, as
illustrated in Figure 2, indicated that perceived normative preferences for iconic
brands fully mediated the participants’ greater liking of the iconic brands, Sobel’s
z ¼ 5.78, p , .0001.5
Effects of Bush priming and endorsement of intersubjectively
important values
In the next step of our analysis, we performed level-2 (between-subjects) analysis
to evaluate the effect of Bush (vs. Obama) priming and personal endorsement of
intersubjectively important values on the effect of iconicity on brand liking. We
regressed the effect of iconicity on brand liking (b1i in Equation 1) on priming
(Contrast 1: Bush vs. Control; Contrast 2: Obama vs. Control), endorsement of
intersubjectively important values (mean-centered), and their interaction.
There was a significant main effect of priming, F(2, 96) ¼ 6.22, p ¼ .003.
Priming Bush (vs. Control) significantly increased the participants’ liking of
iconic (vs. non-iconic) brands (b ¼ 0.21, SE ¼ 0.07, t ¼ 3.02, p ¼ .003). In
contrast, priming Obama (vs. Control) significantly reduced the participants’
liking of iconic (vs. non-iconic) brands (b ¼ 20.24, SE ¼ 0.08, t ¼ 23.14,
p ¼ .002).
The interaction of priming and personal endorsement of intersubjectively
important values was also significant, F(2,96) ¼ 4.14, p ¼ 0.02.As shown in
Figure 3, in the Control Condition, personal endorsement of intersubjectively
5 It could be argued that participants were more familiar with the iconic brands than the non-iconic
ones. Hence, the iconic versus non-iconic brand manipulation might be confounded with brand
familiarity. This, however, is unlikely because all the selected brands are familiar to US consumers.
In addition, we also had participants rate their familiarity with each brand on a five-point scale. When
we included familiarity in the level-1 (within-subjects) regression analysis, perceived normative
preferences still significantly mediated the effect of iconicity on brand evaluations (Sobel’s z ¼ 4.78,
p , .0001). Furthermore, Bush versus Obama priming did not moderate the relationship between
brand familiarity and brand liking (F ¼ 0.65, p ¼ .53). The robust mediation effect of perceived
normative preferences and the lack of Bush versus Obama priming effect on the relationship between
brand familiarity and brand liking together help to assuage the concern that the iconicity manipulation
was confounded with brand familiarity.
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important values had significant positive effect on the liking of the iconic
(vs. non-iconic) brands (b ¼ 0.0066, SE ¼ 0.003, t ¼ 2.22, p ¼ .03). This result
replicated the results of Study 1: Without Bush or Obama priming, participants
who endorsed intersubjectively important values more liked iconic (vs. non-
iconic) brands more. In both the Bush Priming Condition and the Obama Priming
Condition, endorsement of intersubjectively important values was not related to
liking of iconic brands over non-iconic ones (Bush Priming: b ¼ 20.0034,
SE ¼ .0034, t ¼ 1.03, p ¼ 0.31; Obama Priming: b ¼ 20.0046, SE ¼ 0.0033,
t ¼ 21.41, p ¼ .17).
Figure 2. Perceived normative preferences of Americans mediated liking for iconic (vs. non-iconic)
brands (Study 2). The effect of cultural iconicity of brands became nonsignificant (b dropped from
0.26 to 0.10) after controlling for perceived normative preferences.
Figure 3. Effects of Bush priming on perceived normative preferences for and personal liking of
iconic (vs. non-iconic) brands among participants with relatively high (one standard deviation above
the mean) and weak endorsement (one standard deviation below the mean) of intersubjectively
important values: Study 2.
PRIMING BUSH 219
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
9:1
0 1
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
Finally, we repeated the between-subjects (level-2) analysis, replacing the
dependent variable with b2i in Equation 2—the tendency to expect Americans to
prefer iconic (vs. non-iconic) brands. There was a significant main effect of
priming, F(2, 93) ¼ 5.89, p ¼ .004.Participants expected Americans to have a
stronger preference for iconic brands following Bush priming (vs. Control),
b ¼ 0.137, SE ¼ 0.051, t ¼ 2.71, p ¼ .008, but not after Obama priming (vs.
Control), b ¼ 0.019, SE ¼ 0.055, t ¼ 0.34, p ¼ 0.73.Participants who endorsed
intersubjectively important values more strongly also expected Americans to like
iconic (vs. non-iconic) brands more; the main effect of endorsement of
intersubjectively important values was significant, b ¼ 0.006, SE ¼ .001,
t ¼ 4.02, p ¼ .0001.
The interaction was also significant, F(2, 93) ¼ 4.50, p ¼ .01. As illustrated in
Figure 3, in the Control Condition, endorsement of intersubjectively important
values was positively related to the perception that Americans preferred iconic
brands, b ¼ 0.0103, SE ¼ 0.002, t ¼ 4.84, p , .0001. However, the effect of
endorsement of intersubjectively important values was nonsignificant when
participants were primed with Bush or Obama. Following Bush or Obama
priming, endorsement of intersubjectively important values was unrelated to the
perception that Americans preferred iconic brands (Bush Priming: b ¼ 0.0007,
SE ¼ 0.0024, t ¼ 0.29, p ¼ 0.77; Obama Priming: b ¼ 0.0049, SE ¼ 0.0032,
t ¼ 1.53, p ¼ 0.14).
When we designed the present study, we observed that the image of Obama in
popular discourse was more of a change agent than a guardian of conventional
values. Consistent with this observation, following Obama priming (vs. Control),
the participants, irrespective of how strongly they endorsed intersubjectively
important values, lowered their liking for iconic (vs. non-iconic) brands. Thus,
although the participants in the Obama Priming Condition (particularly those who
endorsed intersubjectively important values strongly) were aware of the stronger
normative preferences for iconic brands, they did not like iconic (vs. non-iconic)
brands more. However, because we did not measure Obama as a symbol of
change, this result should be interpreted with caution.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Past culture priming studies have shown that exposure to cultural symbols
increases the likelihood of displaying culturally typical behaviors (Hong et al.,
2000). This effect occurs allegedly because cultural symbols are magnets of
meaning that connect many diverse elements of cultural knowledge (Betsky,
1997). Thus, these symbols can spread activation in a network of cultural
constructs (Hong et al., 2000).
However, there is little research on what constructs in the cultural knowledge
network are activated when individuals are exposed to cultural primes. The
present research builds on the recently formulated intersubjective perspective to
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cultural influence (Chiu et al., 2010) and argues that cultural symbols acquire
their cultural significance in part through their associations with intersubjectively
important values and that cultural symbols can influence personal preferences
through the activation of perceived normative preferences. That is, when
individuals are exposed to symbols that are associated with intersubjectively
important values, these symbols would activate the perceived preferences of
ingroup cultural members, which, in turn, affect personal preferences.
To establish our arguments, we first demonstrated that at both individual and
group levels, although intersubjectively and objectively important values
overlap, the extent of the overlap is small. After we have identified the values that
are objectively important (e.g., egalitarianism and mastery) and those that are
intersubjectively important (e.g., hierarchy and affective autonomy), we showed
that the perceived liking of Bush among Americans is linked to intersubjectively
important values only. Although intersubjectively important values are values
that are widely believed to be popular in the USA, there are individual
differences in the strength of this belief. Americans who believe in the popularity
of these values more strongly also estimate Bush to be more likable among
Americans.
Next, we showed that Americans like brands that symbolize America (vs. those
that do not) more. Moreover, consistent with the past finding that perceived
normative preferences could influence personal preferences (e.g., Zou et al.,
2009), we found that perceived normative preferences fully mediated the greater
liking for iconic (vs. non-iconic) brands. Furthermore, consistent with our idea
that culture priming influences personal preferences through the activation of
perceived normative preferences, we found that priming Bush strengthened the
perception that Americans prefer iconic (vs. non-iconic) brands as well as the
participants’ liking for iconic (vs. non-iconic) brands.
There are individual differences in how strongly people endorse
intersubjectively important values. Consistent with past findings related to the
effect of cultural fit (Wan et al., 2007a, 2007b; Zhang & Chiu, 2012), we found
a positive association between endorsement of intersubjectively important
values and personal liking for Bush in Study 1. In Study 2, we obtained the
same cultural fit effect on the perceived normative preferences for iconic brands
and on the participants’ personal liking of iconic (vs. non-iconic) brands.
However, this effect became nonsignificant following Bush or Obama priming.
This result shows that situated cultural influence through culture priming can
overpower chronic cultural influence on personal preferences (Oyserman & Lee,
2008).
Future studies are required to establish the generality of our results beyond
college student samples and to identify the boundary of the Bush priming effect.
Nonetheless, our findings underscore the importance of intersubjective processes
in cultural influence: Even among Americans who do not endorse
intersubjectively important values, priming Bush could temporarily draw
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attention to the perceived normative preferences of Americans and strengthen the
positive evaluation of iconic brands.
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